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I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
OF THE CASE

This is an appeal from a criminal conviction following a jury trial. Prior to his conviction,
Blair Olsen was the Sheriff of Jefferson County. He was convicted on three separate counts of
violating Idaho Code section 18-5701(1 O)(misuse of public funds) for the single decision of
pern1itting his wife to use his back-up cell phone, a phone that was authorized by the Board of
County Commissioners and paid for by Jefferson County. Mrs. Olsen's personal use of the
autho1ized back-up cell phone did not financially harn1 or even incidentally impact the county in
any way, as this incidental use did not cause any additional expense for the county. This appeal
asse1is the following en-ors in the prosecution: (1) the trial court's failure to dismiss the criminal
action because the comi lacked subject matter jurisdiction, since the appropriateness of the use
of public funds under these circumstances is a political question, thus ban-ing a criminal charge;
(2) the trial court's failure to dismiss on constitutional due process grounds,

because the

charging statute, Idaho Code section 18-5701(10), addressing the misuse of public funds, is
unconstitutionally vague; and (3) the trial court's refusal to properly apply the constitutional
Double Jeopardy doctrine after prosecutors charged one singular act as multiple criminal counts.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

In January 2015, Sheriff Blair Olsen was charged by an indictment with four felonies. R.
p. 10-12. The first three felony counts alleged that the Sheriff violated Idaho Code section 185701(10) by providing his wife, Marie Olsen, with a cell phone that was paid for by Jefferson
County. R. p. 10-12. Subsequently, Sheriff Olsen filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on the
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that the first three counts were multiplicitous, in violation of double jeopardy, and the
count was balTed
5.

to Dismiss

statute of limitations. R.
p. 1-59.

t1ial comi heid that

statute of limitations. Mot. to Dismiss Tr. p. 48, L. 8

was held on March

45-89.

fourth count was ba1Ted

the

p. 50, L. 17. However, the trial couii

denied the request to dismiss counts one through tlu·ee and refused to consolidate them into a
single count. Mot. to Dismiss Tr. p. 50, L. 18

p. 52, L. 8. The tiial comi held that charging the

three separate counts did not violate double jeopardy standards because a "reasonable jury could
conclude that there were separate and distinct acts here in this case" since the charges were for
separate years under separate budgets. Mot. to Dismiss Tr. p. 50, L. 18

p. 52, L. 8. The trial

comi also detennined that under Idaho Code section 18-5702 it was discretionary \vhether to
aggregate the Sheriff's conduct into one count or several counts. Mot. to Dismiss Tr. p. 50, L. 18
p. 52, L. 8.

A trial was held in May 2015 on counts one through three of the indictment. The jury
returned a verdict of guilty on all three counts. R. p. 491-92. Sheriff Olsen then filed a motion for
acquittal on the grounds that the matter involved a non-justiciable political question and that
Idaho Code section 18-5701(10) was unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous. R. p. 518-33. The
trial court denied the motion holding that the political question doctrine did not apply and that
the statute in question was sufficiently clear to comply with constitutional requirements. Mot. for
Acquittal Tr. p. 119, L. 18

p. 133, L. 13.

Sheriff Olsen was sentenced on June 22, 2015. R. p. 584-86. A withheld judgment was
granted and Sheriff Olsen was placed on probation for three years. R. p. 585. However, he was
ordered to serve 30 days of local jail time for each of the tlu·ee counts, to run conculTently. R. p.
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He was also ordered to pay fines of $1,000 each for counts one and tvm and $500 for count
He was ordered to
count

court

per count to

and restitution in the amount of $1

Fund,$ 65
p.

A notice of appeal was filed on August 3, 2015. R. p. 590. Sheriff Olsen is appealing the
trial comi's denial of the motion to dismiss counts one tlu·ough three of the indictment based on
Double Jeopardy, denial of the motion to acquit based on the political question doct1ine, and
denial of the motion to dismiss because Idaho Code section 18-5701(10) is unconstitutionally
vague under due process piinciples. R. p. 591.
C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Blair Olsen started his career \Vith the Jefferson County Sheriffs Office in August of

1975. R. p. 52. He was elected sheriff in 1989 and was the she1iffup until his conviction in May
2015. R. p. 52. Jefferson County has always paid for the Sheriffs home phone service. R. p. 54.
Histoiically, the County paid for deputies' home phone service, but approximately four years
before the indictment the County stopped paying for the home phone line for deputies. It
continued to pay for each deputy's cell phone. R. p. 54. Since cell phones became available for
the Sheriffs Office, Sheriff Olsen always had two cell phones assigned to him. R. p. 55. Initially,
this was due to unreliable service in different parts of Jefferson County. R. p. 55. After the
coverage issues improved, the Sheriff continued to carry the second cell phone as a back-up. R.
p. 55. Thus, he could be reached on his home phone or either of his two cell phones which were
all paid for by the County. R. p. 55.
Jefferson County has an emergency operations plan. Tr. of Kramer Trial Test. p. 5, L. 20p. 6, L. 5; Ex G. That plan is used for emergency response in Jefferson County. Tr. of Kramer
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Test. 5:20-6:5; Ex G. The plan includes specific emergency support functions that specific
or officers are responsible

overseemg.

of

Trial

p. 7,

15.

the emergency support functions is communications and the sheriff is specifically
responsible for overseeing this emergency support function. Tr. of Kramer Trial Test. p. 7, L.415; Ex G, p. 0134. In an emergency, the sheriff is responsible for acquiring, organizing,
coordinating and deploying communications equipment and resources to reestablish and restore
communications. Ex G, p. 0134. The communications equipment includes cell phones. Ex G, p.
0135. In particular, the plan states that cellular telephones "may be needed to supplement
existing communications resources and free tactical radio frequencies." Ex G, p. 0135. This is
more than just a hypothetical plan. Prior to becoming a county commissioner, Deborah Karren
was the Jefferson County emergency management director. Tr. of KaITen Trial Test. p. 30, L. 513. While responding to a disaster, she witnessed She1iff Olsen using two cell phones at the same
time, one at each ear, coordinating with local, state and federal agencies. Tr. of Karren T1ial
Test. p. 30, L. 5-13. In fact, pictures taken during the flood that occu1Ted in 1997 show two
different cell phone numbers for Sheriff Olsen. A picture taken in the emergency operations
center shows a cell number of 521-3861. Ex 0. A picture taken from a forward operations center
shows a cell number of 521-0209. Ex N. The number for the back-up cell phone at issue in this
case is 521-0209.
At some point prior to 2010, Sheriff Olsen began allowing his wife Marie Olsen to caITy
his back-up cell phone with the number 521-0209. R. p. 55. Sheriff Olsen kept a back-up cell
phone in the event his primary phone ever became inoperable or in the event of an emergency. R.
p. 55; Tr. of Karren Trial Test. p. 30, L. 5-13; Ex. G at 0134-0135. By giving it to Marie, Sheriff
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reasoned it ,vould always be charged and available if he needed it or if someone was
to

through his

Tr.

Trial

stated that it was not uncommon for people to call

7,

8,

home phone or

\Vb.en

trying to reach him. R. p. 55. In fact, the 521-0209 number canied by Marie was listed as a
contact number for Sheriff Olsen in the resource manager, a computer based directory used by
the Sheriff's office. Ex. Q. The 521-0209 was also listed as Marie's number on a contact list that
stated how to reach key pers01mel in Jefferson County. Ex 12. Sheriff Olsen never hid the fact
that Marie was canying his back-up cell phone. R. p. 55. He did instruct her not to incur any
additional charges on the phone. R. p. 55. Sheriff Olsen believed her use of his back-up cell
phone was the same as Marie using the home phone that was also paid by the county. R. p. 56.
Although Marie Olsen had been canying the back-up cell phone for some time, it did not
become an issue until the contested, primary election for sheriff in 2012. Tr. of Karren Trial Test.
p. 20, L. 22 - p. 21, L. 6; Tr. of Raymond Trial Test. p. 26, L. 9 - p. 28, L. 1; Tr. of Hegsted
Trial Test. p. 14, L. 22

p. 15, L. 7. A few days before the primary election, a county clerk

called Jefferson County Commissioner Tad Hegsted to report that a county paid cell phone was
being used by someone other than the assigned employee. Tr. of Hegsted Trial Test. p. 9, L. 12 p. 10, L 6. Commissioner Hegsted directed the caller to contact Co1mnissioner Kanen, as she
was the chairperson at the time. Tr. of Hegsted Trial Test. p. 9, L. 12 - p. 10, L 6. The back-up
cell phone with the number 521-0209 was listed with the names of Mike Miller, Andrea Lee and
Blair Olsen on the bills from the canier. Ex 4k, p. 1085. Sheriff Olsen does not know why or
how the names of Mike Miller or Andrea Lee became associated with the number. R. p. 56.

Appellant's Brief - Page 5

Jefferson County did not have a cell phone policy in place at that time. Tr. of Kanen Trial Test.

5,

4-

3.

The court clerk did call Conm1issioner Kanen.

. of Karren

Test. p. 7,

5-24.

Upon receiving the complaint, Commissioner Kanen immediately \Vent to speak with She1iff
Olsen. He explained that the phone in Marie's possession was his back-up phone and he
explained his purpose for having her cany it. Tr. of Karren Trial Test. p. 7, L. 15 - p. 8, L. 16; p.
21, L. 15 - p. 22, L. 11. Commissioner Kanen immediately called an executive session of the
Jefferson County Board of Commissioners that included herself: Commissioner Hegsted and
Commissioner Jerald Raymond. Tr. of Karren Trial Test. p. 9, L. 5-20; p. 22, L. 12 -p. 23, L.1 O;
Tr. of Hegsted Trial Test. p. 10, L 21 - p. 11, L. 15.

B. The Commissioners investigated the

matter thoroughly by interviewing Blair Olsen and reviewing the county paid cell phone bills for
521-0209 and dete1111ined that the phone had never gone over on minutes or incmTed additional
cost to Jefferson County. Tr. of KmTen Trial Test. p. 24, L. 14

p. 25, L. 6; Tr. of Raymond

T1ial Test. p. 31, L. 11-22. The investigation took more than two months to complete. Tr. of
Raymond Trial Test. p. 28, L. 23-25.
Commissioner Kanen testified that she felt good about the situation after discussing it
with Sheriff Olsen. Tr. of Kanen Trial Test. p. 20, L. 3-5. She testified that in hindsight it was
probably poor judgment to allow Maiie to use the back-up cell phone because of the political
tum1oil it caused. Tr. of Karren Trial Test. p. 19, L. 16 - p. 20, L. 5. However, she specifically
detennined that the back-up cell phone was a legitimate use of county funds. Tr. of Kanen Trial
Test. p. 22, L 12-15. As well, she specifically testified that she and the other commissioners
agreed that even though the phone was carried by Marie Olsen, there was a valid public purpose
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back-up cell phone. Tr. of Kanen Trial Test. p. 33, L. 3-12. The comm1ss10ners
that the county did not
nature of

position and

a

to be in contact

that the Sheriff is required
various agencies; and that prior

commissioners had also approved the Sheriff's cell phones. Tr. of Kanen T1ial Test. p. 29, L. 7 16. Commissioner Kanen was unequivocal at trial that after the investigation she

31,

approved Sheriff Olsen's use and maintenance of a back-up cell phone however he saw fit. Tr. of
Kanen Trial Test. p. 45, L. 6 - p. 46, L. 12. In fact, the commissioners left it up to Sheriff Olsen
whether to allow Maiie to continue using the phone. Tr. ofKanen Trial Test. p. 9, L. 5-20.
Commissioner Raymond testified that no phone bills had ever been denied by the
Jefferson County Commissioners in the past. Tr. of Raymond Trial Test. p. 12, L. 8-10. As a
result of their investigation, the commissioners prepared and issued a statement. Ex L; Tr. of
Raymond T1ial Test. p. 12, L 12 - p. 17, L. 23. That statement described the findings and
decision of the Jefferson County Board of Commissioners. Ex L; Tr. of Raymond Trial Test. p.
12, L. 12

p. 17, L. 23. The July 27, 2012 statement explained the Commissioners decision by

stating, in paii:
The Board of County C01ru11issioners was made aware of the usage of county
issued cell phones by non-county employees sometime this past spring. The
Board takes seriously any accusation of any county official. Upon review of the
issue, and finding that the county had no written policy adopted on the use of
county issued cell phones, the Board finalized the policy which has been in draft
from since the spring of 2011. The Board implemented the cunent policy that
now stands as a guide to all Elected Officials, and those employed by the county.
\Ve expect ail Elected Officials and county employees to adhere to the policy as
stated.
By Constitution, the Sheriff is the Chief Law Enforcement Officer in the county.
The list of those needing c01ru1rnnication access to him (her) 24/7/365 include, but
are not limited to; his (her) family, staff, other Sheriff Offices, City Police
Depaiiments, Commissioners, ISP, FBI, National Guard, Homeland Security, the
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Governor, etc. The Office of the Sheriff deals with a multitude of government
agencies.
Board
Commissioners, both past and present, have
the
expenditure a "back-up" cell phone for the Sheriff.
County Commissioners
are responsible for reviewing claims submitted. It is their responsibility to oversee
appropriate expenditures. All cell phone expenditures were approved since the
implementation of cell phones to the county.

Ex~ L. .Lt\_ cell pl1011e policy' \Vas adopted by the Jefferso11 Cou11ty Co1n111issio11ers for tl1e first ti1ne
1

on July 9, 2012. Ex D. The new cell phone policy does not prohibit the use of back-up cell
phones. Ex E; Tr. of KmTen Trial Test. p. 41, L. 4-6. The cmTent policy does not prohibit noncounty employees from using a county paid cell phone. Tr. of Karren Trial Test. p. 41, L. 7-9.
And the cmTent policy continues to allow county paid cell phones to be used to make personal
calls. Tr. ofKmTen Trial Test. p. 41, L. 10-15.
The Commissioners testified at trial that they became aware Marie Olsen was carrying a
back-up cell phone and fully investigated the matter. Tr. of Karren T1ial Test. p. 41, L. 16 - p.
42, L. 3. The matter was treated as a personnel and policy issue and it \Vas appropriately handled
by the Commissioners and completely resolved after it was detennined that there were no
additional charges to the county. Tr. of Raymond Trial Test. p. 26, L. 25 - p. 28, L. 9; p. 31, L.
11-22; Tr. of Karren Trial Test. p. 41, L. 16 - p. 42, L. 3. After investigating the matter, the
Jefferson Board of County Commissioners continued to approve the cell phone bills that were
brought to their attention by the county clerk which contained a charge for the cell phone that
was in Marie Olsen's possession. Tr. ofHegsted Trial Test. p. 19, L. 21

p. 20, L. 2. The Board

approved the use of the back-up cell phone by the Sheriff as he detern1ined was appropriate. Tr.
of Karren Trial Test. p. 45, L. 6 -p. 46. L. 12.
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indictment charged Sheriff Olsen \Vith a felony for m1susmg public funds by
to use his back-up cell phone
funds

the

with a second felony

allowing Maiie to use his back-up cell phone in the

1; and with a third

felony fur misusing public funds by allmving Marie to use his back-up cell phone for part of
2012. The total public funds which were found to be misused came to Sl,023.54.

II.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

W11en the dete1111ination of a public purpose for an expenditure is left to the Jefferson

County Board of Commissioners, did the t1ial court err in not dismissing the ciiminal action
because it would require insertion of the judiciary into a "political question" in violation of the
bedrock principle of constitutional separation of powers?
2.

\Vas Blair Olsen's fundamental, constitutional 1ight to Due Process violated because the

criminal statute at issue was unconstitutionally vague, resulting in arbitrary enforcement and a
lack of the required notice of prohibited conduct?
3.

Was the constitutional principle of double jeopardy violated when the State used a single

decision by Blair Olsen to serve as a basis for three separate felony counts?

III.
STANDARD OF REVIE\V
This appeal involves constitutional questions involving the Double Jeopardy clause and
the Political Question Doctrine. Appellate courts exercise free review over constitutional issues
as they are pure questions of law. Idaho State Ins. Fund v. Van Tine, 132 Idaho 902, 905-06, 980
P.2d 566, 569-70 (1999). Questions of subject matter jurisdiction, such as the political question

Appellant's Brief - Page 9

cairnot be waived, consented to through conduct or acquiescence, nor can a paiiy be
on
195 P.3d

1,

(Ct.

2008); Troutner v. Kempthorne, l

V.

Idaho 389,

393, 128 P.3d 926, 930 (2006).
The appeal also challenges the constitutionality of Idaho Code section 18-5701(10).
\Vhen the constitutionality of a statute is questioned, the appellate comi reviews the trial comi' s
decision de novo. State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 197, 969 P.2d 244, 246 (1998). The paiiy
attacking the constitutionality of the statute has the burden of proof and must overcome a
presumption that the statute is valid. State v. Cook, 146 Idaho 261, 262, 192 P.3d 1085, 1086
(Ct.App.2008).

IV.
ARGUMENT

A.

Political questions cannot, by constitutional mandate, be determined by the judicial
system without violating the bedrock principle of separation of powers, thus this
case should have been dismissed.
The Constitution of the State of Idaho specifies that there is a clear separation of powers

among the three branches of government. The Constitution states:
The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct
depaiiments, the legislative, executive and judicial; and no person or collection of
persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these
departments shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the others,
except as in this constitution expressly directed or pennitted.
Idaho Const. art. II, § 1.

Counties are governmental entities established by the Idaho

Constitution. Idaho Const. aii. XVIII. The Idaho Supreme Court has characterized a Board of
County Commissioners as a "constitutional board" that is "vested by statute with jurisdiction to
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and allow claims." Udy v. Cassia County, 65 Idaho 585, 149 P.2d 999, 1001 (1944). The
County Commissioners also has the right to disallow monetary claims even
been made. See lvfagoon v. Bd. of Comm rs of Valley
1

, 58 Idaho 31

a
80

(1937). With regard to the exercise of this power, the Comi has stated:
Administrative discretion must be lodged somewhere, and after a board of county
commissioners has in good faith acted upon a matter within its jmisdiction,
though carelessly and improvidently, and no appeal is taken, the order becomes
final, and is not subject to collateral attack.
Udy, 65 Idaho 585, 149 P.2d at 1001. The Board of Commissioners has exclusive authority at the

county level to allow or disallow claims, and other county officers, including Sheriffs, are not
authorized to make purchases for use by the county. See Magoon, 58 Idaho 317, 73 P.2d at 82.
Additionally, the Jefferson County Board of Commissioners is the chief executive
authority of the county government. LC. § 31-828. The legislature has specifically granted each
board of county commissioners with the pmver to supervise "the official conduct of all county
officers." LC.§ 31-802; Reynolds Const. Co. v. T1rin Falls Cnty., 92 Idaho 61, 66,437 P.2d 14,
19 (1968). The she1iffis a county officer. LC.§ 31-2001.
The Idaho Constitution also provides that county comm1ss10ners have legislative
authority over all police matters in the county. Idaho Const. aii. XII, § 2. The County
Commissioners are authorized by law to establish and oversee funding for a sheriff's office. LC.
§ 31-4601. The Idaho Legislature has specifically stated that county commissioners have broad
discretion over funding for law enforcement needs on at the county level:
The legislature recognizes that the counties of the state perform vital functions
in administering and delivering law enforcement services to all residents of the
state. The legislature further finds it is necessary that the boards of county
commissioners of the counties of the state be able to address the needs of
county-provided components of the justice system by funding them at levels
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which do not compromise the performance of the justice system as a whole
and which advance the interests of the public, while protecting the rights of
individuals involved with the justice system.
§ 31-4601 (emphasis added). With this understanding the Legislature allows counties to

establish funding for the Sheriff to can-y out the law enforcement needs of the respective
counties. By statute, the board of county commissioners has discretion over the use of this fund.
LC.§ 31-4602.
Idaho courts do not have jurisdiction to rule on issues that would require the com1 to
substitute its judgment for that of another coordinate branch of government if that matter is
properly entrusted to the other branch. Troutner v. Kemptlzorne, 142 Idaho 389, 393, 128 P.3d
926, 930 (2006). This rule oflaw is often refened to as the political question doctrine. On this
doctrine, the United States Supreme Court has stated:
In determining whether a question falls within (the political question) category,
the approp1iateness under our system of govenunent of attributing finality to the
action of the political departments and also the lack of satisfactory criteria for a
judicial detern1ination are dominant considerations. The nonjusticiability of a
political question is primaiily a function of the separation of powers.
Baker'v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,210, 82 S. Ct. 691, 706, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1962) (citation and

quotation omitted). The political question doctrine precludes judicial review of controversies
that "revolve around policy choices and value detenninations constitutionally committed" to
coordinate branches of government. N Lake Tahoe Fire v. Washoe Cnty. Comm'rs, 129 Nev.
Adv. Op. 72,310 P.3d 583,587 (2013) (quoting 16A Am.Jur.2d Constitutional Law§ 268
(2013)). Idaho has adopted the U.S. Supreme Court's framework for detennining whether the
political question doctrine applies:
This Court has adopted the criterion set out in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82
S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962), to detennine whether judicial resolution of an
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issue would require a judicial detem1ination of how another branch of government
should exercise its discretion. See .Miles v. Idaho Po1,ver Co., 116 Idaho 635, 639778 P.2d 757, 761-62 (1989) (applying Baker to separation of powers issue
aiising under A1iicle II, Section 1 of the Idaho Constitution). Baker directs that
the comis examine: (1) lvhether the constitution directs that the issue be
resolved by a coordinate branch of government; (2) whether judicially
manageable standards exist for the resolution of the issue; (3) whether it is
possible to render a decision without making an initial nonjudicial policy
detem1ination; (4) whether judicial resolution would evince a lack of the
respect due coordinate branches of government; (5) whether there is an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or
(6) whether judicial resolution would embarrassingly result in varied rules
among separate departments of government on a single question. 369 U.S. at
217, 82 S.Ct. at 710.
In re SRBA Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho 246, 261, 912 P.2d 614, 629 (1995). The Idaho

Constitution and Idaho statutes commit the county's police power, executive authority, and
purchasing power to the board of county commissioners. Idaho Const. art. XII, § 2; I.C. § 31828; LC. 31-810. Because supervisory authority over the office of sheriff and authority to make
decisions regarding law enforcement spending are vested in county boards of commissioners, the
judiciary does not have jurisdiction to circumvent the Commission's judgment. Once the
Jefferson County Commissioners made a decision that the cell phone had a valid public benefit, a
decision had been made by a branch of government that had authority to act and the courts must
defer to the decision making authmity of the coordinate branch of government.
However, in this case a jury was tasked with reviewing this decision by the Jefferson
County Commissioners as part of the judicial branch and to "substitute its judgement" for that of
the Board of Commissioners. This meant that the decision of the County Commissioners did not
cany with it the finality it was intended to have by law. The jury also lacked the proper
information and criteria to detennine whether the expenditure for a back-up cell phone served an
adequate public purpose for Jefferson County. The jurors were all residents of Twin Fall's
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The county's decision resolved around policy choices--recognizing that there may be
incidental private benefit to the expenditure that did not increase the cost to the
The Jefferson County Board of Commissioners addressed the matter and specifically
approved the expenditure of a back-up cell phone that was carried by Sheriff Olsen's \vife. The
County Commissioners testified they handled the matter and considered their resolution to be
final. Tr. of Ray111ond Trial Test. p. 26, L. 23 - p. 28, L. 1. Govenunental entities make decisions
all the time about policies regarding official versus private use of govenm1ent O\Vned or
controlled devices, how much someone can drive a government vehicle, how much an employee
can use provided equipment, such as computers, personal use of cell phones, etc. This case
involves a policy decision by a coordinate branch of government. This is not a case where an
employee or officer stole county funds to pay for personal purchases. This is a policy decision
on whether there was a valid govenunental purpose and benefit for Sheniff Olsen to have a
back-up cell phone accessible to him and even though it was in his wife's possession and used by
her. The Jefferson County Commissioners determined under these circumstances there was a
valid benefit to Jefferson County. There was no additional expense to the County from Marie's
use of the phone. The Commissioners made a policy decision that the back-up cell phone
benefited the county and was a beneficial and meritorious expenditure of public funds. That
decision should not have been second guessed by the courts under Idaho's constitutional framework of separation of powers.
The decision in Troutner v. Kempthorne effectively illustrates these points. Troutner, 142
Idaho 389, 128 P.3d 926. In Troutner, members of a political paiiy brought suit against various
elected officials and members of the Judicial Council for violating a statutory provision when
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appointing members to the Judicial Council. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court reasoned that because
appointments in question were subject to approval

the Senate, the issue of whether the

appointment violated statutory law was something that the Senate debated prior to confinning
the appointment. Id. The Comi then stated:

It would violate the separation of powers guaranteed by A1iicle II, § 1, of the
Idaho Constitution for this Court to substitute its view for that of the Senate
regarding whether Reberger ,vas qualified to be appointed to the Judicial Council.
e must appreciate and respect the allocation of power to another branch of
government. .... The district comi did not en in holding that judicial review of the
Senate confim1ation would violate the doctrine of separation of powers.

,v

Id. Another branch of government was tasked with detem1ining whether the requirements of the

statute had been satisfied. Thus, the Supreme Court upheld the district court's detern1ination that
judicial review of that decision was not appropriate.
The political question doctrine was also applied in Idaho State AFL-CIO v. Leroy, 110
Idaho 691, 698, 718 P.2d 1129, 1136 (1986). In Leroy, various unions, union officers and others
affiliated with the unions filed a complaint to enjoin the authentication, ce1iification and
enforcement of an emergency right to work bill. The Union's primary argument was that events
which preceded the enactment of the bill did not actually constitute an emergency. The Supreme
Court rejected this argument and held:
Plaintiffs' ultimate asse1iion is that the events which precipitated the enactment of
H.B. 2 did not rise to the level of an actual emergency. \Vhether this is true or
not, we hold that the legislature's determination of an emergency in an act is
a policy decision exclusively within the ambit of legislative authority, and the
judiciary cannot second-guess that decision. In the absence of a legislative
invasion of constitutionally protected rights, the judicial branch of government
must respect and defer to the legislature's exclusive policy decisions. Such is
the very nature of our tripartite representative form of government.
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Thus, the Supreme Court deten11ined that the judiciary will not second guess policy decisions
are

authority of the other branches

government and must defer to those policy

The facts here are similar to those in Troutner and Leroy. The Jefferson County Board of
Commissioners has supervisory authority over the Jefferson County Sheriff and has auth01ity to
set policies regarding the police power vested in the counties by the Idaho Constitution. The
Commissioners have sole power to allow or disallow claims. The Board of Commissioners
investigated the complaint that Marie Olsen was carrying a county paid phone. Testimony at trial
from the then-sitting county commissioners was that the Board detem1ined there \:Vas a legitimate
need for the Sheriff to have access to a back-up cell phone and that it was pem1issible for his
wife to caiTy the back-up phone if that is how he chose to maintain the phone. This constitutes a
policy decision made by the chief executive authority and legislative authority in Jefferson
County. The results of the Commissioners' investigation were made known to the public through
a public statement issued on July 27, 2012. Ex. L. The question at issue is one involving
"govenn11ental authority and policy" and "courts have no jurisdiction or authority to consider"
such matters. Luker v. Curtis, 64 Idaho 703, 136 P.2d 978, 980 (1943). Even if a court disagrees
with the action taken by a legislative body, such as a board of commissioners, the comi is to
defer to the legislative body. In State v. Clark, this Court stated:
The courts may differ with the legislature as to the wisdom and propriety of a
particular enactment as a means of accomplishing a paiiicular end, but as long as
there are considerations of public health, safety, morals, or general welfare which
the legislative body may have had in mind, which have justified the regulation, it
must be assumed by the court that the legislative body had those considerations in
mind and that those considerations did justify the regulation. When the necessity
or propriety of an enactment is a question upon which reasonable minds might
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differ, the propriety and necessity of such enactment is a matter of legislative
detem1inati on.
V.

88 Idaho 365, 376, 399

-9)),

1

1

(1

(upholding the validity

a

subdivision ordinance). Although the political question doctrine is most often applied in civil
matters, it has been applied in criminal proceedings in other jurisdictions. United States v.
J!olliday, 70 U.S. 407, 418, 18 L. Ed. 182 (1865); People v. Ohrenstein, 153 A.D.2d 342, 357-

58, 549 N.Y.S.2d 962, 970-71 (1989) affd, 77 N.Y.2d 38, 565 N.E.2d 493 (1990) (applying the
political question doctrine to prevent the prosecution oflegislative aides); State v. Chvala, 2004
WI App 53, ~ 58, 271 \Vis. 2d 115, 153, 678 N.W.2d 880, 898 qffd, 2005 \VI 30,

~

58, 279 \Vis.

2d 216, 693 N.W.2d 747 (finding some allegations contained in a criminal complaint to be not
justiciable under the political question doctrine).
The actions by the Jefferson County Board of Commissioners were within their power
and authority as the chief executive body, and tlu·ough the Board's legislative authority over all
police matters in the county, and the sole authority to allow or disallow claims, such as the cell
phone bill. The Board authorized the cell phone bill even after it was made aware that a county
paid cell phone was in Marie Olsen's possession and that she was using it to make personal calls.
Sheriff Olsen's past and cunent conduct was ratified after the Board detem1ined that there was a
legitimate county purpose for the sheriff to have a back-up cell phone and that the Board
considered the safety and welfare of the County when it made that decision. Further, the
investigation by the cunent commissioners found that the cell phone bill had been approved by
prior commissioners and that allowing Marie to use the phone and thus the incidental personal
purpose, did not incur any additional expense for Jefferson County.

Appellant's Brief - Page 17

The correct method for addressing such policy issues is through elections and not through
, u u . .- ·

proceedings. In fact, such decisions by county commissioners can only be reviewed by a

comi if properly appealed. "\Vhere the Board of County Commissioners acts on matters
within its jurisdiction and no appeal is taken, then the act becomes final and is not subject
to collateral attack." Udy v. Cassia County, 65 Idaho 585, 149 P.2d 999 (1944) (emphasis
added); Cobbley v. City of Challis, 143 Idaho 130, 134, 139 P.3d 732, 736 (2006). The cell
phone bills were paid only after the claims were authorized by the Board. Such decisions are not
subject to judicial review or a contrary jury determination, absent a showing that such a
governmental entity acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or in an unreasonable manner and a comi
should not substitute its judgment for that of a governmental entity absent such a showing.

Larsen v. Vill. of Lava Hot Springs, 88 Idaho 64, 73, 396 P.2d 471, 476 (1964). If there was an
issue with the Commissioners' decision to authorize the back-up cell phone and to allow Marie
to use that phone, a civil proceeding should have been commenced to appeal that decision. That
was not done and the decision by the Commissioners is final. It should not have been the subject
of a c1iminal indictment.
The transcript and record in this case clearly shows that the County Commissioners took
time to investigate this issue, examine the various aspects of the issue, and detennined, in a
public decision, that the charges were appropriate and within the sheriffs discretion. The issue
that was tried in this case falls squarely within the purview of the political question doctrine
which means that the Court never had jurisdiction to hear this matter because it is a non
justiciable issue. Troutner v. Kempthorne, 142 Idaho 389, 393, 128 P.3d 926, 930 (2006); State

v. Rhoades, 119 Idaho 594, 600, 809 P.2d 455, 461 (1991). Therefore, the trial court's decision
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on the motion for acquittal should be reversed. Sheriff Olsen should never have been indicted or
on

use of the back-up cell phone.
State's opposition to Olsen's motion regarding the application of the political

question doctrine was based on the timing of the motion and the argument that the Board of
Commissioners could not condone or ratify "illegal" acts under the ,guise of "political question."
Regarding the first argument, the State contended that because the argument was raised post-trial
"goes to the weight of the arguments." Mot. for Acquittal Tr. p. 60, L. 12-17. That is not
persuasive. The political question doctrine is a question of justiciability. Cmmn v. Bd. of
Comm'rs of Fremont Cty., 143 Idaho 501, 509, 148 P.3d 1247, 1255 (2006). As such, it can be
raised at any time, including after trial or for the first time on appeal. Blankenship v. Washington
Trust Bank, 153 Idaho 292, 295, 281 P.3d 1070, 1073 (2012). A question of justiciability does
not have greater or lesser weight based on when it is raised. An issue is either justiciable or it is
not. In this case, the political question doctrine applies and this matter is non-justiciable.
The second argument propounded by the State is that the decision by the Board conflicts
with Idaho Code section 18-5701(10) and is therefore not a valid exercise of the Board's power.

It is true that a county does not have power to act in a manner that is in conflict with the general
laws of the state. Idaho Const. art. XII, § 2. The particular statute here makes it a crime to use
public funds to make a purchase for any personal purpose or for any purpose other than for the
use or benefit of the govermnental entity. LC.§ 18-5701(10). The Board's actions in this case are
consistent with this law. First, only county commissioners can make purchases with county
funds. Udy, 65 Idaho 585, 149 P.2d 999, 1001; ~Magoon, 58 Idaho 317, 73 P.2d 80. It was the
Board that approved the cell phone bills from the Sheriffs office each month. The Board had
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to disallow the cell phone bills even after they had been paid. See Afagoon, 58 Idaho 317,
Board had power to spend money

enforcement purposes as it dete1111ined

were necessary. I.C. § 31-4601. The Jefferson County Board of Commissioners detern1ined that
there was a legitimate need for the Sheriff to have a back-up cell phone. Their investigation
revealed that there was no additional expense to Jefferson County in allov,'ing Marie to carry and
use the phone. Thus, they concluded that expenditure for the back-up phone was for the use and
benefit of the county and not for a personal purpose. They ratified the past conduct by not
disallowing the prior expenditures and then paid the outstanding bill with full knowledge that the
back-up cell phone was in Marie's possession. This action did not condone c1iminal conduct and
is completely consistent with the powers vested in the Board.
The tlial court's ruling was based on the conclusion that the political question doctiine
argument was "based on a false premise that the Jefferson County Commissioners approved the
defendant's wife's use of the cell phone" and that any approval only came after the conduct was
discontinued. Mot. for Acquittal Tr. p. 120, L. 6-24. Even if this is true, that is not relevant to the
application of the political question doctrine which is only concerned with whether the policy
making authority has been vested in a coordinate branch of government. Furthennore, this
conclusion is not consistent with the testimony offered by the Commissioners. The
Commissioners testified that the phone was in Marie's possession when they conducted their
investigation and that it "was up to the sheriff' to decide whether to allow Marie to continue
using the phone. Tr. of Karren Trial Test. p. 9, L. 5-20. The Sheriff decided to discontinue
Maiie's use of the phone because of political tum1oil. The trial comi's rationale implies that it
would have been better had she continued to use the phone so that the time could pass and the
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Commissioners could have approved more bills while the phone was in her possession. Mot. for
p. 120,

6-24. However, the trial comi's rationale is faulty because Commissioner

testified that the Board approved the bill that was questioned by the county clerk. Tr.
Hegsted T1ial Test. p. 19, L. 21 - p. 20, L. 2. Before that bill was paid, Commissioner KaITen
testified that the Commissioners became fully aware through their investigation that the phone
was in Maiie's possession and that she was using it to make personal calls. Tr. of Karren Trial
Test. p. 7, L. 20 - p. 9, L. 13. In her testimony Commissioner KaITen stated:
A. An employee at the clerk's office called me with that concern. And I believe I
\Vent right in, and she explained to me about a cell phone that the sheriff had and
that she believed that his wife was using. And as soon as she told me that, I went
over to the Sheriffs Office and asked him about it. And he explained to me that it
was his backup phone and that his wife had the phone to keep it charged and to
keep it accessible to him. And that made perfect sense to me, rather than having it
in a drawer stashed somewhere.

Q. So the purpose that the defendant told you about, was that it was to keep it
charged and to keep it accessible for his use; is that correct?
A. That's co1Tect.

Q. 'W11at did he tell you about her personal use of the phone?
A. That she did use it for personal use because she had it. And, you know, I can't
see having a cell phone that's not used, might as well use it. And she was
available to answer it if a call came for him as well.

Tr. of Karren Trial Test. p. 7, L. 20 - p. 8, L. 16. It was only after obtaining this infonnation that
C01mnissioner Karren called for the executive session. Tr. of Karren Trial Test. p. 8, L. 5-1 O; Tr.
of Raymond Trial Test. p. 25, L. 6-p. 27, L. 10; p. 31, L. 11-p. 32, L. 3; Tr. ofHegsted Trial
Test. p. 19, L. 21 - p. 20, L. 2. It was with full knowledge that the phone was in Maiie's
possession and that she was using it for personal calls that the C01mnissioners approved the cell
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bill brought to their attention by the court clerk. Tr. ofHegsted Trial Test. p. 19, L. 21 - p.

2.
The trial court also detennined that granting an acquittal based on the political question
doctrine would allow counties to retroactively circumvent state laws. Mot. for Acquittal Tr. p.
121, L. 10-12. There is not a single piece of evidence in the record that the Commissioners were
attempting to circumvent state law by their actions. When the Commissioners investigated
Sheriff Olsen, detennined that there was a valid governmental benefit to him having access to a
back-up cell phone and that the county did not incur any additional expense, Blair Olsen had not
been charged with a crime and there was not even a criminal investigation underway. The
Jefferson County Commissioners have authority and discretion to determine local policy,
spending for the Sheriffs office, and are the direct supervisor over the Jefferson County
Sheriff's budget. County commissioners should be allmred to perform their discretionary duties
and then answer to their constituents. 1 County Commissioners are in a position to understand the
particular needs of their county and how money is best spent to meet those needs. For example,
Commissioner Karren had personally witnessed Sheriff Olsen use two cell phones during a flood
emergency in the County. She knew that her rural county was susceptible to the same or similar
emergencies that would require the Sheriff to again need two cellphones. It was with that
knowledge and the knowledge that she and the other Conunissioners obtained in their
investigation that lead them to approve the back-up cell phone and left it up to the Sheriff to
decide if Marie could use it because it would not incur any additional expense to the county.
Allowing a jury to second guess that policy decision violates the political question doctrine.
1 It is worth noting that in a letter dated October 7, 2015, the Office of the Attorney General infonned the Jefferson
County Commissioners that it would not be pursing criminal charges against the Commissioners for ratifying Ms.
Olsen's use of the cell phone.
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Others may disagree with the Commissioners' decision, but that disagreement should be handled
the political process and not circumvented tlu·ough criminal prosecutions.
Due Process was violated by application of a criminal statute that produced
arbitrary enforcement and thus did not provide the required notice of ,Yhat conduct
was prohibited. The action should have been dismissed.

The Idaho Supreme Court has succinctly stated the analysis under the void-for-vagueness
doctrine:
The void-for-vagueness doctrine is premised upon the due process clause of the
Fomieenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. This doctrine requires that a
statute defining criminal conduct be worded with sufficient clarity and
definiteness that ordinary people can understand ,vhat conduct is prohibited and
that the statute be worded in a manner that does not allow arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement. It is a basic principle of due process that an
enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined.
Fmihennore, as a matter of due process, no one may be required at the peril of
loss of liberty to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. This Court has
held that due process requires that all "be informed as to what the State
commands or forbids" and that "men of common intelligence" not be forced to
guess at the meaning of the criminal law. A statute may be void for vagueness if
it fails to give adequate notice to people of ordinary intelligence concerning
the conduct it proscribes, or if it fails to establish minimal guidelines to
govern law enforcement or others who must enforce the statute.
A statute may be challenged as unconstitutionally vague on its face or as applied
to a defendant's conduct. For a "facial vagueness" challenge to be successful,
"the complainant must demonstrate that the law is impennissibly vague in all of
its applications." In other words, the challenger must show that the enactment is
invalid in toto. To succeed on an "as applied" vagueness challenge, a
complainant must show that the statute, as applied to the defendant's conduct,
failed to provide fair notice that the defendant's conduct was proscribed or failed
to provide sufficient guidelines such that the police had unbridled discretion in
detennining whether to arrest him. A "facial vagueness" analysis is mutually
exclusive from an "as applied" analysis.
State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 711-12, 69 P.3d 126, 131-32 (2003) abrogated on other grounds
by Evans v. Michigan, 133 S. Ct. 1069, 185 L. Ed. 2d 124 (2013) (citations omitted) (emphasis
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Idaho Code section 18-5701(10) is unconstitutionally vague when it is applied to the
circumstances of Sheriff Olsen's case.
Idaho Code section 18-5701(10) reads as follows:
No public officer or employee shall:
(10) Knowingly use any public moneys, or financial transaction card, financial
transaction card account number or credit account issued to or for the benefit of
any governmental entity to make any purchase, loan, guarantee or advance of
moneys for any personal purpose or for any purpose other than for the use or
benefit of the governmental entity.
I.C. § 18-5701(10). In this case, Sheriff Blair Olsen was the chief law enforcement officer in
Jefferson County. As a result, the Sheriff has to be available at all times day and night. Jefferson
County has historically paid for the Sheriff's home phone to ensure the Sheriff and his deputies
could be contacted. More recently, the County paid for the Sheriff and his deputies to have cell
phones. At no time has personal use of county paid land lines or cell phone lines been prohibited.
Additionally, the She1iff has had need for two cell phone lines in order to perforn1 his
responsibilities. The uncontrove1ied testimony at trial was that the Sheriff used two cell phones
during emergencies in order to maintain communications with the various local, state and federal
agencies that assist in emergencies like the 1997 flood. For several years the Sheriff canied two
cell phones. However, because the Sheriff detennined that it would be best to have his wife carry
his back-up cell phone to ensure it was charged and available, he was indicted.
As applied, section 18-5701(10) could be violated any time there is an incidental personal
purpose associated with the use of public money.2 For example, the Sheriff also authorized cell
phone plans for his deputies, and the deputies could and did use their cell phones to make
2 Idaho Code section 18-5701(10) does not establish a dollar criteria for this felony. Misuse of public funds, no
matter how small, is a felony that results in jail time, fines, disqualification from holding public office, and loss of
constitutional rights.
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personal calls. It could be argued that those personal calls are not for the use or benefit of the
governmental entity

any way. However, no one would dispute that there is a need for the

Sheriff and his deputies to have ce11 phones. Because the statute makes no allowance for the
possibility that the personal purpose for a use of public funds may be insignificant or incidental
compared to the primary purpose for the expenditure of public moneys, or that the personal
purpose does not increase or require expenditure of public funds, as is the case here, it is too
vague to be enforced. Under this statute, a sheriff would have to consider all possible purposes
for any purchases and ensure that he did not authorize any expenditure that might have an
incidental personal purpose. Paying for gas for a Sheriffs vehicle that a deputy drives to his
personal residence at night could be characterized as an expenditure for a personal purpose
because the deputy does not have to pay for transportation to and from his place of work.
However, having the official vehicle visible in local communities can actually reduce the
incidence of c1ime in a community because there is a visibly heightened law enforcement
presence. Similarly, the Sheriff has authorized the purchase of computers for use in the office
and pays for the office to have internet access. County policy does not prohibit employees from
utilizing the internet during breaks for personal purposes. Under the wording of the statute, it
could be argued that the employee committed a felony because the computers and internet were
purchases made that had an initial governmental purpose, but which could also be used for a
personal purpose or use other than to benefit the governmental entity, even though the personal
purpose was incidental and insignificant compared to the benefit confen-ed on the governmental
entity. In this case there was no additional expenditure by the county for the personal purpose, as
the govenm1ental purpose was for the sheriff to have two cell phones, and that is the only cost
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by the country. Tr. of Raymond Trial Test. p. 26,
Test. p. 41,

16-

25

p. 28, L 9; p. 31, L. 11-22;

3.

statute does not make allowance for the possibility that there may

incidental and

inconsequential personal purposes for a purchase that primarily benefits the governmental entity.
Under the law, any per diem that the She1iff auth01ized for deputies when traveling for training
or for other official purposes would be a violation of the statute because feeding a deputy is a
personal purpose and has a purpose other than to benefit the county. The Sheriff would have to
constantly vet every purchase to ensure that there was no personal benefit for any purchase and
to ensure that any benefit was exclusive to the county and did not have any ancillary benefit to
any individual.
The statute 1s also unconstitutionally vague on its face. This statute requires law
enforcement to evaluate every conceivable purpose for the expenditure of public moneys, even
p1ivate, unstated purposes or benefits. The law allows for arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement. "Personal purposes" is not defined by the statute and no direction is provided as to
how to interpret or enforce the statute. There is no objective definition of "any personal purpose"
or "any purpose other than for the use or benefit of the govenunental entity." For example,
presumably it would be pennissible for an elected official to pay for a hotel room and fuel for
transportation with public money when traveling outside of the county to conferences benefitting
the county. However, if the official's spouse were to travel with the official and stay in the hotel
room, then it could be argued that public money was expended for personal purposes and/or for a
purpose other than for the use and benefit of the governmental entity. The statue does not only
prohibit misuse of public money, it prohibits using public money for any purpose which may be
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incidentally "personal" regardless of the benefit to the governmental entity. The statute as
does not give notice as to what conduct is prohibited or would subject the offender to
prosecution and thus permits arbitrary enforcement.
In addition, there are no guidelines to detennine a "personal purpose" or address the issue
of incidental personal benefits associated with the expenditure of public money. This is
problematic because it is the govermnental entity that should determine what is a proper use and
benefit for that entity and not the State's attorney. There are no standards for detern1ining \vhat is
to be considered a benefit for the governmental entity. Making that detennination is the
responsibility of elected officials who answer to the electorate and should not face the possibility
of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of a c1iminal statute when elected officials make
decisions that may be unpopular or when the official's political allegiances differ from those
enforcing this vague statute. The vagueness of this statute allows it to be wielded as a political
sword to prosecute public officials for purely political purposes. \Vithout any direction, the
wording of the statute allows for subjective application of the law and selective prosecution of
unpopular decisions by political figures. For the above stated reasons, the trial court ened in
failing to declare Idaho Code section 18-5701(10) void for vagueness.

C.

The trial court subjected Blair Olsen to multiple punishments for a single course of
conduct by allowing three separate felony counts. This was a violation of the Double
Jeopardy clause of the U.S. Constitution and the trial court's decision should be
reversed and the counts dismissed.
The State of Idaho has violated Sheriff Olsen's constitutional right against double

jeopardy by charging him with three separate felonies for a single course of conduct. The trial
court ened in failing to dismiss, or consolidate into a single count, Counts I, II and III in the
indictment. The State impennissibly charged Sheriff Olsen with three counts of misuse of public
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funds pursuant to I.C. § §18-5701(10). Even though the conduct charged occmTed over three
these counts all arose out of a single continuous transaction. Each Count has exactly the
same elements of proof and factual allegations, resulting in unconstitutional double jeopardy.
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution provides that no person
shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." The Clause
affords a defendant three basic protections. It protects against a second prosecution for the same
offense after acquittal, a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and multiple
ciiminal punishments for the same offense. State v. B,yan, 145 Idaho 612, 615-16, 181 P.3d 538,
541-42 (Ct. App. 2008); (citing Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 229, 114 S.Ct. 783, 789, 127
L.Ed.2d 47, 56 (1994); State v. AfcKeeth, 136 Idaho 619, 622, 38 P.3d 1275, 1278
(Ct.App.2001)). In Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306
(1932), the United States Supreme Court held that "where the same act or transaction constitutes
a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to detennine whether there
are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other
does not." State v. B1yan, 145 Idaho at 615-16; (citing Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304, 52 S.Ct. at
182, 76 L.Ed. at 309). "In order to avoid multiplicity under the Blockburger test, only one fact or
element need be different for each charge." State v. Hussain, 143 Idaho 175, 177, 139 P.3d 777,
779 (Ct.App.2006). The assumption underlying the rule against multiple punishments is that a
legislative body ordinaiily does not intend to punish the same ciiminal transaction twice. FVhalen

v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 691, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 1437, 63 L.Ed.2d 715, 723 (1980). The
Idaho Court of Appeals adopted the analysis set fo1ih by the 5th Circuit for purposes of
detennining whether charges are multiplicitous:
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Multiplicity is charging a single offense in more than one count in an indictment.
The chief danger raised by a multiplicitous indictment is the possibility that the
defendant will receive more than one sentence for a single offense. The test for
detennining \Vhether the same act or transaction constitutes two offenses or only
one is whether conviction under each statutory provision requires proof of an
additional fact which the other does not. Moreover, whether a continuous
transaction results in the commission of but a single offense or separate
offenses ... is determined by whether separate and distinct prohibited acts,
made punishable by law, have been committed. An offense is separate and
distinct when conviction under one count requires proof of an additional fact that
the other count does not require.
Sanchez v. State, 127 Idaho 709, 713-14, 905 P.2d 642, 646-47 (Ct. App. 1995) (quoting United
States v. Nguyen, 28 F.3d 477 (5th Cir.1994)) (emphasis added). This case does not involve charges

under separate statutes. It involves multiple charges for a single continuous transaction.
The Court of Appeals more recently refined the inquiry and pointed out another type of
test that is applicable here. In State v. }doad, 156 Idaho 654, 660, 330 P.3d 400, 406 (Ct. App.
2014), review denied (Aug. 15, 2014), the Comi stated:
Whether a course of criminal conduct constitutes one offense or several depends
upon "whether or not the conduct constituted separate, distinct and independent
crimes." State v. Major, 111 Idaho 410,414, 725 P.2d 115, 119 (1986). This "can
be a troublesome question," id. (footnote omitted), and "requires an inquiry into
the circumstances of the conduct and consideration of the 'intent and
objective of the actor.' "State v. Bush, 131 Idaho 22, 34, 951 P.2d 1249, 1261
(1997) (quoting Major, 111 Idaho at 414, 725 P.2d at 119).
(emphasis added). The detennination whether double jeopardy applies is a question of law to be
decided by the Court. Id. at 658, 330 P.3d at 404. Thus, the Comi should have considered the
circumstances of the alleged conduct and the intent and objective of Sheriff Olsen in deciding the
issue as a matter oflaw.
The trial comi did not decide this matter as a question of law or properly apply the
standard found in Moad. Instead the trial comi found:
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I looked at the statute carefully, and I looked at the evidence that was presented to
the grand jury, and assuming that the State can persuade the jury in this case
beyond a reasonable doubt of the evidence they presented to the grand jury, which
was obviously a probable cause standard, I think that there is a basis for the Comi
to conclude that a reasonable jury could conclude that there were separate and
distinct acts here in this case, that I think the statute gives the prosecutor very
clearly a substantial amount of discretion that says that the incidents may be
aggregated into one count, but it doesn't say they have to be aggregated into one
count.
So I think certainly if he'd been charged in this instance with 28 different counts,
that would have struck me as a bit of a prosecutorial piling on, and I think I would
have responded appropriately to that. But I think breaking it down by year is
rational and reasonable, and I don't think it's an overreaching act by the
prosecutor.
So the Court finds that pursuant to Sanchez and other sections of Idaho law, that
the three different counts are for three different years, three different periods of
time. During those periods of time, I believe there were different budgets for the
She1ift's Office dming those periods of time, different funds were extended. They
may be different phones.
Again, there's enough evidence there that a jury could conclude, certainly for
purposes of the grand jury's standard, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
there were three different counts there.
Mot. to Dismiss Tr. p. 50, L. 25

p. 52, L. 8. The first error is that the tiial comi decided this as

a question of fact and detem1ined that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to detennine that
there were separate, distinct and independent crimes. The tiial comi incorrectly determined that
there was sufficient evidence for a jury to make that finding and improperly deferred to the jury.
Moad, 156 Idaho at 658, 330 P.3d at 404 (stating that whether double jeopardy applies is a
question oflaw to be decided by the court).
Second, Afoad requires that a court analyze the intent and objective of the actor to
determine whether the conduct in question was an independent crime. The trial court did not
consider Sheriff Olsen's intent or objective when concluding that each year Sheriff Olsen
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committed a separate and independent cnme. Thus, the trial comi did not apply the correct
standard when analyzing this issue. The county comm1ss10ners

investigate

Sheriff's

and objective in giving his wife his back-up cell phone. They testified that it ,vas to keep
the back-up cell phone readily available, charged, and to have his wife be available to answer the
phone if someone was trying to reach the Sheriff.
The circumstances of the conduct demonstrate that a single decision was made by the
She1iff, long before 2010, to keep a back-up cell phone vvfoch his wife was allowed to use as
long as she did not incur any additional charges based on her use of the phone. There is no
evidence of any intermittent cancellation and re-activation of the cell phone in question
following 2010. There is no evidence that at the beginning of each year She1iff Olsen made a
new decision to allow his wife to cany his back-up cell phone. A new decision was not made in
January 2010, January 2011, and January 2012 to provide his wife with his back-up cell phone.
The use was continuous from the earliest time that a charge could be brought under the statute of
limitation (January 23, 2010), until the phone was turned off in April of 2012.
The evidence in the record demonstrates that the intent and objective of Sheriff Olsen
was not to commit separate crimes. His conduct was part of one continuous transaction that
could only be considered a single offense. \\Then considering the circumstances and the intent of
the Sheriff, the charges in Counts I, II, and III of the Indictment are multiplicitous, and should
have been dismissed or merged into a single count as a matter oflaw.
The trial court did state that the separate counts were based on different years when the
court speculated there may have been different budgets and may have been different phones.
Mot. to Dismiss Tr. p. 50, L. 18 - p. 52, L. 8. As stated previously, this should have been decided
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the comi and not left for the jury. However, even if the comi had reached the decision on
grounds there is no evidence that there was a different phone or different plans from one
to the next. As well, even

there were different budgets for each year that does not satisfy

the Sanchez standard of "An offense is separate and distinct when conviction under one count
requires proof of an additional fact that the other count does not require." Sanchez, 127 Idaho at
713-14, 905 P.2d at 646-47. Sheriff Olsen did not decide each year \vhen he was given a new
budget that it was his intent and objective to make a personal purchase with county funds by
allowing his wife to continue canying his back-up cell phone. Sheriff Olsen made one decision
to have his wife cany that cell phone and did not revisit the issue each year. R. p. 56-57. It was
the same cell phone on the same contract every year. Thus, this is distinct from the sale of
narcotics in Blockburger. In that case the U.S. Supreme Comi found that the sale of narcotics to
the same purchaser at three different times constituted separate purchases. The Comi stated: "In
the present case, the first transaction, resulting in a sale, had come to an end. The next sale was
not the result of the original impulse, but of a fresh one-that is to say, of a new bargain."
Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 303, 52 S. Ct. at 181. The Comi noted that the first and second sales

involved narcotics that were not from the same package. In this case, there was no "fresh"
impulse at the begim1ing of each year by She1iff Olsen to have his wife cany his back-up cell
phone. Instead, it was one decision that was never revisited by the Sheriff. That there was a new
budget each year is not relevant because the cell phone did not cost the county any more than
when it was carried by the Sheriff. The distinction in the time pe1iods made by the trial court and
the prosecution is irrelevant, arbitrary and subjected Sheriff Olsen to Double Jeopardy.
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The State will argue that it chose to aggregate the She1iff' s conduct from January 2010
through Ap1il 2012 into three separate Counts.

Idaho Code section 18-5702(4)(a) only

pennits separate incidents to be aggregated into one count The statute provides:
(4)(a) \Vhen any se1ies of violations of section 18-5701, Idaho Code, comprised
of separate incidents of misuse of public moneys in amounts less than three
hundred dollars ($300) are part of a common scheme or plan, the incidents
may be aggregated in one (1) count and the sum of the value of all of the
incidents shall be the value considered in detem1ining whether the amount
exceeds three hundred dollars ($300).
LC. § 18-5702(4)( a) (emphasis added). The trial comi determined that the statute gave the State
discretion to aggregate the separate incidents into a single count or into several counts. The trial
comi focused on the vvord "may," which does signify that the prosecution has discretion to
aggregate counts. But the statute clearly states that the discretion is limited to aggregating the
separate incidents into one count. The statute does not give discretion to aggregate into several
counts.
However, the trial court did not find as a matter of law that the Sheriff's conduct
constituted separate incidents or that those separate incidents were pali of a common scheme or
plan. ·Those are prerequisite findings that must be made before aggregation is allowed by the
statute. In this case the statute is not ambiguous so the plain meaning of the words in the statute
are controlling. Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'l 1i1ed. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502,
506 (2011). The plain meaning of the statute is that separate incidents that are pali of a common
scheme or plan can be aggregated into "one (1) count." There is no discretion to combine the
separate incidents into three counts.
The trial couli did note that it may have been improper to charge 28 different counts.
That is correct and had the trial court continued with its reasoning it would have realized that the
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charged here did not involve even three separate and independent criminal acts. Even if
were detern1ined that each month constituted a separate criminal

the statute

acts to be aggregated into a single count. Thus, the trial court erred by refusing to
consolidate the charges into one count under Idaho Code section 18-5702(4)(a).
The decision should be reversed as a violation of double jeopardy for charging and then
punishing She1iff Olsen multiple times for a single course of conduct. This prejudiced the Sheriff
at trial and gave the appearance that there had been multiple missuses of public funds instead of
a single decision to pennit his wife to carry his back-up phone. The counts should be dismissed
as a matter of law because double jeopardy attached once the jury was sworn in. Sheriff Olsen
cannot be prosecuted a second time for single count. State v. Stevens, 126 Idaho 822, 825, 892
P.2d 889, 892 (1995); State v. jfanley, 142 Idaho 338,343, 127 P.3d 954, 959 (2005).

V.
CONCLUSION
The conviction of Blair Olsen should be overturned and the three felony counts for
violation of Idaho Code section 18-5701(10) should be dismissed. Blair Olsen's right to not be
punished multiple times for the same offense was violated when the trial court allowed the State
to charge three separate felonies for the single act of allowing his wife to carry his back-up cell
phone. That was one decision that was not revisited by the Sheriff on a monthly or yearly basis
because allowing her to use the phone did not incur any additional expense for the county than
when the phone was maintained by the Sheriff.
Additionally, the prosecution of Sheriff Olsen was a non-justiciable political question
because of the constitutional principle of separation of powers. \Vhether or not the Sheriff should
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be allowed to have a back-up cell phone that was caiTied by his wife was a policy decision that
was \Yithin the power vested in the Jefferson County Board of Commissioners by the Idaho
Constitution and Idaho statutes. As the authority to make this decision was completely vested in
a separate branch of government, the cou1i had not jurisdiction to hear the matter and the State
could not collateral attack the decision made by the County Commissioners.
Finally, Idaho code section 18-5701(10) is unconstitutionally vague. The statute does not
provide notice of what conduct is prohibited by the statute because the tem1s are not defined and
subject to contradicting interpretations. The law gives no direction to law enforcement about how
to enforce the statute. By the very language of the law, law enforcement must subjectively and
arbitrarily decide what purchases with public funds are made for a purely personal purpose or for
purposes other than for the use and benefit of a governmental entity. Thus the conviction should
be overturned and the charges against Blair Olsen should be dismissed.
DATED this ~__ day of March, 2016.
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